Vaultan’s security design
Exactly how the app protects your data, written so that anyone can follow it and a security firm can check the app against it. Where Vaultan cannot protect you, this page says so.
On this page
- In short
- Your pattern is the key
- What is stored on your phone
- Separate and decoy vaults
- Emergency erase
- Recovery phrase
- Cloud backup and sync
- Backup files and secure shares
- While a vault is open
- What Vaultan does not protect against
- Network, analytics and the store review code
- Independent review and reporting problems
- Technical appendix
In short
- Everything in a vault is encrypted on your phone before it is saved: photos, videos, files, thumbnails, names, notes, passwords, two-factor codes and journal entries.
- Your pattern is the key. It is never stored. Each time you draw it, the app turns it into an encryption key.
- There is no Vaultan account and no Vaultan server. Nothing is ever sent to us.
- Cloud backup keeps encrypted copies in your own iCloud or Google Drive. The app offers it the first time you open a vault, and nothing is uploaded until you agree.
- The main limit: a pattern is a short secret. Anyone who gets a copy of the right data can try patterns on their own computers. This page explains when that can happen and how to protect yourself.
Your pattern is the key
A pattern is a path through the dots of a 5 by 5 grid. It needs at least six dots and one change of direction, and no dot can be used twice. The app suggests eight dots or more.
The pattern is never saved. When you draw it, Vaultan stretches it into a 256-bit key with a slow, standard method (PBKDF2 with SHA-256), mixed with a random value that was made on your phone the first time the app ran and is kept in the phone’s protected key storage (the iOS Keychain, or storage protected by the Android Keystore). The stretching is tuned so that one try takes about a third of a second on your phone. That key unlocks your vault’s own random master key, and the master key unlocks everything else.
Every move on the game board that forms a valid pattern is tried as a pattern. A move that opens nothing just plays the game. There is no attempt counter and no lockout, because a counter would itself show that a vault exists. The only thing that slows down guessing on the phone is the time each try takes.
How many patterns are there? If every step goes to a neighbouring dot, which is how most people draw, there are about 74,000 six-dot patterns, 296,000 seven-dot patterns and 1.1 million eight-dot patterns. That is not many for a computer, which is why the protections described below matter.
What is stored on your phone
Vaultan keeps 32 vault slots on every phone, whether you use one vault or many. Each slot is a set of fixed-size files. Unused slots are filled with random bytes that look the same as real ones, so the files alone do not show how many vaults you have.
Each item is stored as an encrypted file with its own random key. Files are encrypted in 1 MB pieces that cannot be swapped, reordered or changed without the app noticing. A vault’s catalog (the list of its items, albums, passwords, two-factor codes and journal entries) is one encrypted file, padded to a whole number of 4 KB blocks.
A few small values are kept in the phone’s protected key storage instead of in files: the random value used with your pattern, the list of which slots are in use, and an encrypted copy of each vault’s recovery phrase. On iPhone they are marked for this device only, so they do not move to a new phone through a backup. On Android they are left out of Google backups and phone-to-phone transfers.
Some things need a decrypted copy for a short time: playing a video, exporting or sharing an item, and new photos before they are encrypted. These copies are kept in the app’s private temporary folders and deleted when the vault locks or when the app next starts. Deleting is ordinary file deletion. iPhone and Android encrypt each file with its own key and discard that key when the file is deleted, which makes the old data unreadable in practice, but it is not a certified forensic wipe.
Your phone’s own backup (iCloud, a computer or Google) can include Vaultan’s encrypted files but not the protected key storage. After such a backup is restored on a new phone, each vault is opened with its recovery phrase, not its pattern.
Separate and decoy vaults
Each pattern opens its own vault, with its own key. A decoy vault is an ordinary vault you can open if someone pressures you to unlock the app. Nothing inside a vault lists or counts the others.
The honest limits:
- Someone who examines the phone with forensic tools can see how much encrypted data there is in total. If they also know your decoy’s pattern, they can see that some of it is not in the decoy.
- Someone who can extract the phone’s protected key storage can see how many vaults exist.
- A very large vault has a catalog bigger than any of the random fillers.
- On the free plan, which allows two vaults, trying to add a vault from inside one says the limit is reached when another vault exists.
- With cloud backup on, each backed-up vault is a separate folder in your cloud storage.
A decoy helps against a person who demands to see inside the app. It is not a guarantee against a full forensic examination.
Emergency erase
An emergency erase pattern opens an empty vault. Before it opens, the app replaces every other vault’s files on this phone with new random data and deletes their encrypted items. What was in those vaults is gone from this phone. The app then removes the encrypted cloud backup copies in your iCloud or Google Drive as well, starting with the key files that make a backup openable. If the phone is offline at that moment, this is done the next time the app runs with a connection.
What it does not reach:
- Your other devices. A vault that is also on another phone or tablet stays on that device, and that device will back it up again the next time the vault is opened there. Until the phone that ran the erase has been online, the cloud copies are still in the cloud.
- Backup files you have saved, shares you have sent and anything you have exported.
- Photos still in your phone’s own photo library.
An emergency erase vault is never offered cloud backup. Erasing takes a moment, and if the app is stopped part-way through, the erase may be incomplete. After a cloud copy is deleted, Apple and Google keep deleted data according to their own policies.
Recovery phrase
A recovery phrase lets you set a new pattern if you forget yours, and opens your vault after a device backup is restored on a new phone. It is optional, but without it a forgotten pattern means the vault is lost, for you and for us.
A phrase made by the app is 12 words from a list of 256, about 96 bits of randomness, which is far beyond guessing. You can choose your own instead (at least four words and 20 characters). A line from a song, a book or your own life is much easier to guess, so we recommend the generated phrase.
The phrase is stretched the same slow way as the pattern and locks a copy of the vault’s master key. That locked copy is stored with the vault files, so it travels with device backups. That is why the phrase works on a new phone, and also why a weak custom phrase is a risk: someone with a copy of your device backup could try phrases offline.
While a vault is open you can view its phrase again. The copy kept for this is encrypted with the vault’s own key.
Cloud backup and sync
Cloud backup keeps an encrypted copy of a vault in your own cloud storage: the app’s private iCloud database on iPhone and iPad, or the app’s own private folder in Google Drive on Android. On Android the app asks Google for that one folder only; it cannot see your other files and does not ask for your name or email address. Vaultan runs no server and never receives the data.
The first time you open a vault (other than an emergency erase vault), the app offers encrypted backup. On iPhone and iPad signed in to iCloud, it shows a notice and backup starts when you tap OK; choosing “Turn off” means nothing is uploaded. On Android you are asked, and Google then shows its own permission screen. Nothing is uploaded before you answer. You can turn backup off for any vault in Settings, and keep or delete the cloud copy.
What is uploaded: every item, thumbnail and catalog exactly as it is stored on the phone, already encrypted; and the vault’s master key, locked two ways so that a new device can open the backup: once with your pattern (stretched with 900,000 rounds of PBKDF2) and, if the vault has a recovery phrase, once with the phrase.
What Apple or Google, or someone who gets into your account, cannot do: read your photos, videos, files, names, album names, notes, passwords, two-factor codes, journal entries or vault names, or change any of them without the app noticing.
What they can see: that you use Vaultan; how many vaults are backed up (one folder each); how many items each vault has, roughly how big each one is, and when things were added, changed or deleted; how many of your devices sync each vault; and whether each backup can be opened with a pattern, a phrase or both. File names are random-looking codes with short fixed labels that show what kind of file each one is.
The limit you need to know. Because a backup opens with the vault’s pattern unless you change it, anyone who holds the backup can try patterns against it on their own computers, without your phone and with no limit on attempts. Patterns are short secrets, so a short or common pattern will not hold up against a determined attacker. To protect yourself, use a long pattern, and turn on Extra protection for new devices in the vault’s cloud backup settings. It removes the pattern-locked key from the cloud, so that only the recovery phrase opens the backup. It needs a recovery phrase, and it stays off unless you turn it on.
Smaller points. Removing a vault’s recovery phrase does not remove the phrase-locked copy of the key that is already in the cloud. Turning backup off without deleting the copy leaves the copy in the cloud. After a copy is deleted, Apple and Google keep deleted data according to their own policies, which Vaultan cannot control. Sync between your devices only happens while the vault is open, because the keys exist only then.
Backup files and secure shares
A backup file holds one whole vault, already encrypted, plus the vault’s key locked with a passphrase you choose (at least 12 characters and rated Strong). Without the passphrase the contents cannot be read. The start of the file is not encrypted, though: it shows the vault’s name, whether it is a main, decoy or emergency erase vault, how many items it holds and their sizes, and when it was made. Treat those details as visible to anyone who has the file.
A secure share is one file holding the items you picked, re-encrypted with a one-time phrase of six random words that you send separately. The file shows only that it is a Vaultan share, how big it is, and the settings used to stretch the phrase. Expiry dates, open limits and the “allow saving” switch are enforced by the Vaultan app that opens the share. They stop casual re-sharing. They cannot stop a recipient who has the phrase and the skills to decrypt the file another way, or who photographs the screen.
While a vault is open
- Leaving the app locks the vault straight away (the default), or after 1 or 5 minutes if you choose. Pickers, the share sheet and purchases that Vaultan opens itself do not lock it, unless they stay open for more than 10 minutes.
- Locking drops the keys from the app’s memory and deletes decrypted temporary files. The app cannot guarantee that the phone’s memory is overwritten straight away.
- Android: screenshots and screen recording are blocked while a vault is open, and the app-switcher preview is blank. This is on by default and can be turned off. iPhone: apps cannot block screenshots, so Vaultan covers its screen whenever it leaves the foreground and the app-switcher picture shows nothing.
- Copied passwords and codes: on iPhone they stay on this device (they are not sent to your other Apple devices) and expire after the time you choose, one minute by default. On Android they are marked as sensitive so the clipboard preview hides them, and the clipboard is cleared after that time while the app is still running.
What Vaultan does not protect against
- Someone who sees you draw your pattern, in person or on camera, can open that vault.
- A phone with malware, or one that is jailbroken or rooted, can be watched while you use it, including your pattern and what is on the screen.
- Someone who gets a full copy of your phone’s protected key storage (for example with a forensic tool, on a phone that has been unlocked since it was last turned on), or a copy of your cloud backup, can try every short pattern on their own computers. Use a long pattern, and Extra protection for cloud backups.
- Someone who has your unlocked phone for a long time can keep trying patterns, because there is no lockout.
- A full forensic examination may show that more vaults exist than the one you opened (see Separate and decoy vaults above).
- Copies outside the vault: photos left in your photo library, things you exported or shared, screenshots on iPhone, and cloud copies of vaults erased by emergency erase.
- The app being noticed. Vaultan is listed under its own name on your phone and in the app stores. The game is there so that a quick look shows a game; it does not hide what the app is.
- Losing both your pattern and your recovery phrase. Then nobody can open the vault, including us.
Network, analytics and the store review code
The app’s own network use is cloud backup and sync, to iCloud or Google Drive. Other traffic comes from the App Store or Google Play when you buy or rate the app, and from links you open in your browser. The app contains no analytics, advertising or crash-reporting code. The photo editor’s face and background detection runs on the phone.
Apple’s and Google’s app reviewers cannot buy subscriptions while they test the app, so they are given a private code that turns on Pro features on their test phone for 14 days. The app checks the code against a fingerprint built into each release, and the code stops working after a fixed date. It changes plan limits only: it does not open any vault, reveal any key or skip any pattern. The code is never published.
Independent review and reporting problems
This page is written so that an independent security firm can check the app against it. Until such a review has been published, it is our own account of how the app works.
Found a security problem? Email [email protected] with the steps to reproduce it.
Technical appendix
For security reviewers. The full design, with file formats and a threat model, is the reference document for the independent review.
| Part | How it works | Code |
|---|---|---|
| Random numbers | The operating system’s secure random generator (Dart Random.secure). | lib/core/crypto/crypto_engine.dart |
| Pattern to key | PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 over "VT-PATTERN-v1", grid size, length and cells; one 32-byte salt per device; 210,000 to 1,200,000 iterations, calibrated to about 350 ms. | crypto_engine.dart, pattern_codec.dart, vault_manager.dart |
| Vault master key | 256 random bits, sealed with the pattern key in a 512-byte slot record (AES-256-GCM, AAD VT-SLOT-v2). 32 slots, random fillers when unused. | lib/core/vault/slot_pool.dart |
| Subkeys | HKDF-SHA256 from the master key, info "file", "index", "thumb", "recovery-view", "cloud-id", "cloud-keytag". | lib/core/vault/vault_store.dart |
| Items | Random 256-bit key per item, wrapped with the file subkey; contents in 1 MiB chunks, AES-256-GCM with a counter nonce and the item ID as AAD. | vault_store.dart |
| Catalog | JSON padded to 4,096-byte blocks, AES-256-GCM with a random 96-bit nonce, AAD VT-INDEX-v1. | vault_store.dart |
| Recovery phrase | 12 words from 256 (96 bits) or custom; PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with a 32-byte salt in recovery/rsalt.bin; 320-byte recovery slot, AAD VT-REC-v2. | lib/core/recovery/recovery_service.dart |
| Cloud key envelopes | "VTCK", iteration count, 16-byte salt, AES-256-GCM. Pattern: 900,000 iterations, AAD VT-CLOUDPAT-v1. Phrase: the phone’s iterations, AAD VT-CLOUDKEY-v1. | lib/core/cloud/cloud_sync.dart |
| Cloud storage | iOS: CloudKit private database, container iCloud.app.vaultan, zone "vault". Android: Google Drive appDataFolder, scope drive.appdata. | VaultanNativePlugin.swift, drive_store.dart, MainActivity.kt |
| Backup files | "VTBK", plain JSON header, master key under PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 (passphrase, 16-byte salt) and AES-256-GCM, AAD VT-BACKUP-v1. | lib/core/backup/backup_service.dart |
| Secure shares | "VTSH", 6-word phrase (48 bits), PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, HKDF subkey per item, chunked AES-256-GCM. | lib/core/share/share_service.dart |
| Key storage | iOS Keychain, after first unlock, this device only. Android EncryptedSharedPreferences with a Keystore key, excluded from backup and transfer. | lib/core/storage/secure_store.dart |
This page describes the app as it is built today. When the design changes, this page changes with it.